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I Case No. 890642-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington County, Utah in a civil case 
following a bench trial. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) , but transferred this case 
to the Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Leon Sprouse obtained a judgment and foreclosed on a motel 
he had sold to Arjen Jager under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Artie Edmunds, the real estate agent who brought the parties 
together, held an assignment of a $25f000.00 interest in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (UREC) for the commission and 
counterclaimed for payment. Third-party plaintiffs (Edmunds, his 
broker, and broker company) sued Leon Sprouse for the real estate 
commission earned in connection with the sale. Trial was held 
July 1, 1988 and the Court entered judgment against Sprouse for 
$33,239.46, finding liability for the commission and attorney's 
fees, and finding that the assignment of an interest in the UREC 
entitled the holder to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's 
sale, and that the holder, under the facts presented, was 
entitled to priority. After several unsuccessful post-judgment 
motions, Sprouse now appeals the Court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Sprouse raises four issues in his appeal brief claiming that 
(1) a modification of a contract for a real estate commission 
does not need to be in writing and does not need to be signed by 
the real estate broker; (2) the great weight of the evidence 
showed that the real estate agent consented and agreed to a 
modification that relieved Sprouse of personal liability for the 
commission if Arjen Jager, the purchaser, defaulted; (3) the 
trial court erred in enforcing the "Note" and "Assignment" 
portions of the "NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT" (hereinafter "NAA") 
document that only Sprouse signed, while refusing to enforce the 
"Agreement" portion that purported to relieve Sprouse of personal 
liability for the commission; and (4) that the award of 
attorney's fees is not supported by the evidence. 
Respondents contest these issues and present the following 
points: 
1. Assuming, arguendo, that Sprouse is correct on his first 
three issues, the judgment should still be affirmed because: 
A. Sprouse has acknowledged liability for the 
commission. 
B. The judgment was also based upon Sprouse fs 
assignment to Interwest Commercial Properties (hereinafter "ICP") 
of an undivided $25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (UREC), entitling Artie Edmunds, the holder, to share in 
the proceeds. 
C. The assignee (ICP/Edmunds) of a partial assignment 
of payments owed under the UREC is entitled to priority in 
payment over the assignor (Sprouse), especially where the 
documents manifest the parties1 intent to pay the commission 
first. 
2. The statute of frauds applies to the NAA insofar as it 
attempts to modify the broker's written commission agreement and 
the broker is the party to be charged when the landowner 
(Sprouse) alleges an oral agreement that reduces or eliminates 
the landowner's liability for a commission. 
3. Marshalling of the disputed trial evidence shows an 
adequate basis to support the trial court's finding that the 
parties did not mutually agree to modify the written commission 
agreement so as to relieve Sprouse of liability if Jager 
defaulted. Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to 
enforce a term of the NAA that, upon disputed evidence, the court 
found had not been mutually agreed upon. 
4. The award of attorney's fees was adequately supported by 
the evidence. Alternatively, Sprouse cannot attack that part of 
the judgment on appeal because he and the court accepted a 
proffer as to reasonableness of the fees and did not challenge 
the fees at trial, and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5), as in effect at the times in 
issue, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
• • • • 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a) (1) provides as 
follows: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion 
to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context; or 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a civil case to enforce a written agreement for a 
real estate commission and to enforce a note and an assignment of 
A 
an interest in a Uniform Real Estate Contract given to secure the 
commission on the sale of a motel in St. George, Utah. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
Leon Sprouse filed a complaint against Arjen Jager September 
10, 1986 after Jager defaulted under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on the motel purchased from Sprouse. (R. vol. I, pp. 
1-7.) Sprousefs Second Amended Complaint filed December 9, 1986 
sought a judicial foreclosure against Jager and named Artie 
Edmunds as a defendant because Edmunds claimed certain rights as 
the holder of the NAA, and requested an adjudication of Edmund's 
alleged interest. (R. vol. I, pp. 93-103.) Jager counterclaimed 
against Sprouse for rescission, alleging that Sprouse made 
fraudulent representations to induce him to purchase the motel, 
and requested $85,000.00 refunded for the value of three 
properties given to Sprouse as the down payment and another 
$100,000.00 for improvements he made to the motel property prior 
to his default. Jager also filed a cross-claim against Edmunds 
alleging misrepresentation as the sales agent in the transaction. 
(R. vol. I, pp. 107-120.) Edmunds filed a counterclaim against 
Sprouse claiming a $25,000.00 interest in the UREC as the holder 
of the NAA and the right to participate in the foreclosure and 
asserted a priority right to payment. Edmunds also cross-claimed 
against Jager for foreclosure of his interest in the UREC. (R. 
vol. I, pp. 126-134.) Sprouse answered Edmunds counterclaim, 
admitting the assignment and Edmunds right to participate in the 
R 
foreclosure to protect his interest in the UREC. (R. vol. I, pp. 
143-145.) 
On September 29, 1987, a motion to intervene (R. vol. II, 
pp. 31-32) was made by Interwest Commercial Properties (ICP) and 
Roy Larsen, as the licensed real estate broker for ICP, in order 
to maintain an action for the commission. On October 14, 1987, 
during a summary judgment hearing, the court granted the motion 
(R. vol. I, pp. 290-291), and the third-party complaint was filed 
October 22, 1987 (R. vol. II, pp. 83-90), seeking a judgment 
against Sprouse for the commission. Sprouse eventually answered 
the third-party complaint and filed a counterclaim alleging that 
Edmunds had misrepresented Jager's financial ability to him. (R. 
vol. II, pp. 111-120.) 
In the main action, the court granted partial summary 
judgment at the October 14, 1987 hearing, and on November 5, 
1987, findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with a 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, were entered. Jager's 
claims, and claims between Sprouse and Edmunds, as well as the 
intervention claims of ICP, were all reserved for later 
adjudication. (R. vol. II, pp. 92-99.) The UREC was foreclosed 
at a sheriff's sale held December 10, 1987, and sold to Leon 
Sprouse for his bid of $360,000.00. (R. vol. II, pp. 102-103.) 
Shortly before trial, the parties stipulated to reduce the 
attorney's fees portion of the judgment against Jager, and to 
dismiss the remaining claims made by or against Jager, and the 
court entered orders to carry out the stipulations. (R. vol. II, 
pp. 188-195.) Trial of the remaining claims was held July 1, 
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1988. The court found the issues in favor of third-party 
plaintiffs and against Sprouse. The court eventually entered 
Reinstated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reinstated 
Judgment on July 12, 1989. (R. vol. Ill, pp. 147-155.) The 
delays were caused by the court's request for briefs before 
ruling, the withdrawal of Sprouse's trial counsel, time for new 
counsel to obtain a trial transcript, and the filing of 
post-trial motions such as objections to the findings, motion for 
new trial, and the like. 
Sprouse has timely appealed from the final judgment entered 
on July 12, 1989. 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
This action arises out of a sale of the Oasis Motel in St. 
George, Utah by Leon Sprouse to Arjen Jager on a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (UREC). 
Artie Edmunds, a real estate sales agent for Interwest 
Commercial Properties (Tr. 77) , knew that the motel had been 
listed for sale and that Sprouse would pay a commission (Tr. 
78-79) , so that when Arjen Jager contacted him (Tr. 81) about 
acquiring a motel, he showed Jager the outside of the Oasis Motel 
(Tr. 81-82) . When Jager expressed an interest, Edmunds contacted 
Sprouse (Tr. 83), and Sprouse said he would look at an offer (Tr. 
84). Jager made an offer of purchase involving trading several 
of Jagerfs interests in other properties as the down payment. 
Edmunds hand-delivered the offer to Sprouse at his home in Las 
7 
Vegas (Tr. 87) . Sprouse would not accept the offer until he 
inspected the trade properties. 
Edmunds and Sprouse met in Salt Lake City and together 
examined the trade properties (Tr. 88-89) . Jager agreed to 
modify his offer to meet Sprouse1 s objections (Tr. 90, 197, 
200-201), and on March 11, 1985, Edmunds travelled to Sprouse's 
home again to present Jagerfs second offer of $475,000.00, which 
Sprouse accepted (Tr. 91-92, 167). 
This Earnest Money Sales Agreement (EMSA) is Trial Exhibit 
No. 2. It was for $475,000.00, with $85,000.00 being allowed for 
Jager's equity in an assignment of contract ($50,000.00), Salt 
Lake duplex ($25,000.00), and Salt Lake home ($10,000.00), and 
with the balance of $390,000.00 to be paid on a contract (Tr. 
47-49). It contains a section setting forth the agreement for 
payment of the real estate commission, which Sprouse would not 
sign until it was changed from a 6% commission (or $28,500.00) to 
a $25,000.00 commission (Tr. 92-93, 193). It also contains a 
provision for attorney's fees (paragraph B, page 3 and R. vol. 
II, p. 88). 
Edmunds testified that it was understood that the commission 
would be paid on a deferred payment schedule because Sprouse 
would not receive any cash at closing to cover the commission 
(Tr. 93). Sprouse acknowledges this understanding, but testified 
that Edmunds also agreed, before he signed the EMSA, that if 
Jager subsequently defaulted, there would be no further payments 
on the commission (Tr. 193) . Edmunds disputed that testimony 
(Tr. 118) and testified that he never agreed to forgo the 
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commission if Jager defaulted because his broker was adamantly 
against anything like that (Tr. 118). Poy Larsen, the broker, 
testified that he never agreed to forgo the commission if Jager 
defaulted and never authorized Edmunds to make any such agreement 
(Tr. 26, 42), that he has never, in any transaction, agreed to 
forgo a commission if the buyer defaulted (Tr. 42), and that he 
has never seen such a transaction (Tr. 36) . Claudia Ashby, 
president of the Washington County Board of Realtors and a 
Director of the Utah Association of Realtors, was accepted by the 
court as an expert witness (Tr. 18) , and testified that although 
about 10% of real estate closings involve some deferral of 
commission payments, usually with a note (Tr. 19), she had never 
seen an agreement where the obligation to pay a deferred 
commission was conditioned upon the buyer's payments (Tr. 20). 
The transaction closed on Friday, March 29, 1985 in St. 
George. All the closing documents were prepared by James Ivins 
of Meridian Title Company at the request of Jager (Tr. 48, 211), 
since he had previously done work for Jager and was familiar with 
Jager1s Salt Lake properties (Tr. 212). Among the many (Tr. 218) 
closing documents prepared by Ivins were Trial Exhibits 3 through 
15. Exhibit 3 is a Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by 
Sprouse and Jager showing the price of $475,000.00, with 
$85,000.00 credit for exchange of properties, and a balance of 
$390,000.00. Sprouse testified that he reduced the commission to 
$25,000.00 on the EMSA (Tr. 193) because he wanted $450,000.00 
for the property and told Edmunds he'd have to put his commission 
on top of that (Tr. 196) . Accordingly, Sprouse acknowledged that 
9 
the $475,000.00 price and the $390,000.00 contract balance both 
include the $25,000.00 commission. 
Ivins prepared a NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT (NAA), Trial 
Exhibit No. 15, to cover this $25,000.00 commission. The NAA is 
the primary focus of the controversy in this action. It is only 
signed by Sprouse. 
Ivins, called as a witness by Sprouse, testified that 
Edmunds called him on March 14, 1985 and gave him information, 
some of which pertained to the commission, and that he prepared 
the NAA based on information obtained from Edmunds during the 
call and from a note he received from Edmunds after that call 
(Tr. 237). Ivins testified that in the note Edmunds "reiterated 
the basic terms of the payment of the real estate commission" 
(Tr. 220-221). During cross-examination Mr. Ivins produced the 
written note he received from Edmunds, and it was received as 
Trial Exhibit No. 24 (Tr. 235-236) . Ivins then admitted that 
there was nothing in Exhibit No. 24 to support the second to last 
paragraph of the NAA (Exhibit No. 15), but that he included this 
paragraph based upon his recollection of the prior telephone 
conversation with Edmunds on March 14, 1985 (Tr. 238-239). Ivins 
admitted having telephone conversations with Mr. Jager (Tr. 211, 
240) and Mr. Sprouse (Tr. 223, 241) prior to the time he prepared 
the NAA, and testified that in this complicated transaction, he 
was generally getting information from lots of different places 
and people, and that when he drafted the agreement, it was the 
culmination of all the facts that had been given to him (Tr. 
240) . 
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Edmunds testified that he called Mr. Ivins about March 13, 
1985f and, regarding the commission, told Mr. Ivins that it would 
be a deferred commission over four years at the same interest 
rate as the contract on the motel, that it was to be secured by 
the property, and that ICP was to have the right to step in and 
take over the contract (Tr. 104-105) , but testified he did not 
tell Mr. Ivins that Sprouse would not be liable if Jager 
defaulted (Tr. 105, 118-119). Edmunds testified that except for 
the second to last paragraph, the NAA pretty much followed the 
information he gave to Ivins, and that he did not learn of the 
language in that paragraph until after Jager defaulted more than 
a year later (Tr. 119) . 
The NAA is only signed by Sprouse. Sprouse (Tr. 176) and 
Ivins (Tr. 216) testified that the NAA was one of the closing 
documents signed on March 29, 1985, while Edraunds testified that 
he did not recall seeing the NAA at closing (Tr. 117, 145, 
148-149). The NAA bears a date of April 1, 1985. Mr. Larsen, 
the broker, testified that the NAA was delivered to his office 
after the closing (Tr. 23). Ivins testified it may have been the 
last document handled at the closing (Tr. 216) and that he did 
not know if Edmunds had a complete set of documents at the 
closing (Tr. 220). All of the other closing documents were dated 
March 29, 1985 (Tr. 161 and Exhibits 3 through 14). 
Sprouse testified that, at his request, Ivins made a 
hand-written change in the NAA before Sprouse signed it (Tr. 
202). Ivins, an attorney (Tr. 211), testified that he did not 
intend to have anyone but Sprouse sign the NAA (Tr. 225), that he 
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did not have Edmunds or ICP sign the NAA because the form did not 
have a place for their signature (Tr. 233) , that he did not 
remember why he did not have Edmunds initial the hand-written 
change to the NAA (Tr. 234-235) , and that he did not know about 
the statute of frauds (Tr. 242) . Ivins testified that generally 
only the maker of a note and the assignor of an assignment sign 
those documents (Tr. 233) , but acknowledged that the NAA also 
purported to be an agreement between two parties, Sprouse and ICP 
(Tr. 219) , and admitted that it should have been signed by both 
parties (Tr. 234) . 
If the $25,000.00 commission had been paid at closing, it 
would have been distributed as follows: ten (10%) off the top, 
or $2,500.00, to Joan Templeton, as the original listing agent; 
sixty (60%) percent of the $22,500.00 balance, or $13,500.00, to 
Artie Edmunds as the selling agent; and forty (40%) percent of 
$22,500.00, or $9,000.00, to ICP as the broker company (Tr. 
27-28, 120). However, the commission was scheduled to be paid at 
$640.00 a month over 4 years (Exhibits 15 and 20), so it was 
agreed that Edmunds would acquire the entire note. Edmunds did 
this by giving up his share of other commissions due him. Both 
Edmunds (Tr. 120-121) and his broker, Roy Larsen (Tr. 30) , 
testified that Edmunds acquired ICP's share by payment of 
$9,000.00 cash. 
Shortly after the closing, ICP assigned the full note to 
Edmunds (Trial Exhibit 16). On April 24, 1985, before the first 
monthly payment was made, Edmunds assigned the note to Draper 
Bank for a loan he owed to the bank (Tr. 123, Exhibit No. 18). 
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After Jager defaulted, Draper Bank contacted Edmunds and 
wanted something done on their loan (Tr. 129) , and assigned the 
NAA back to Edmunds (Tr. 124, Exhibit No. 19). 
Jager made 13 monthly payments of $3,687.50 before he 
defaulted on the June 1, 1986 payment (Tr. 50, Exhibit No. 5), 
and $640.00 of each payment had been applied to the commission, 
reducing the unpaid commission to $19,226.80 when Jager stopped 
making payments (Exhibit No. 21) . With interest to the day of 
trial, the balance due on the commission note on July 1, 1988 was 
$24,239.46 (Tr. 124-125, Exhibit No. 21). 
Jager relinquished possession of the motel to Sprouse on 
June 28, 1987 (Tr. 50, 51, 61), ten months after Sprouse 
commenced this action. Sprouse pursued a judicial foreclosure 
and on November 5, 1987, the court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions Of Law (see Appendix "A") and a Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure (see Appendix "B"). The judgment was originally 
for $472,473.40, including $15,000.00 for Sprouse's attorney's 
fees (P. vol. II, p. 97). Later, by the stipulation of all 
parties, those fees were reduced from $15,000.00 to $3,720.50 (R. 
vol. II, 188-189), and an order was entered in accordance 
therewith, thereby reducing the judgment to $461,193.90. 
The judgment ordered the property sold at sheriff's sale, 
which was held on December 10, 1987. Edmunds attended the 
sheriff's sale intending to bid (Tr. 134), but Sprouse made the 
first bid of $360,000.00, and no higher bids were made (Tr. 135). 
The property was sold to Sprouse for his bid of $360,000.00 (R. 
vol. II, pp. 102-103). The bid, by court order, reduced the 
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judgment by $360,000.00, leaving a judgment of approximately 
101,193.90 against Jager. 
Jager1s down payment, valued at $85,000.00, consisted of one 
duplex, one single family home, and a note worth $50,000.00 (Tr. 
46-47, Exhibits 2 and 3). Jager testified that in the year prior 
to his default, he completely rebuilt 10 motel units at a cost of 
$100,000.00, and increased business 40% (Tr. 49-50). Sprouse did 
not offer any evidence to challenge this testimony. Sprouse had 
regained possession of the motel a year before trial, and 
acknowledged at trial that he still had the benefits of the trade 
properties and was still receiving substantial monthly payments 
from them (Tr. 205-206). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even if Sprouse is correct on the first three points raised 
in his brief, he is still liable because (1) he included the 
commission in his judgment against Jager; (2) he assigned an 
undivided $25,000.00 interest in the UREC to secure the 
commission, and Edmunds, the holder, is entitled to share in the 
proceeds from the sheriff's sale; and (3) Edmunds, as an assignee 
of a partial assignment the balance of which is held by the 
assignor (Sprouse), is entitled to priority in payment over the 
assignor (Sprouse) . Thus, even if the second to the last 
paragraph of the NAA were enforceable, third-party plaintiffs are 
still entitled to be paid because of the assignment of a 
$25,000.00 interest in the UREC. 
Sprouse cannot enforce the second to the last paragraph of 
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the NAAf however, because the NAA was not signed by Edmunds or 
ICP, the party Sprouse wants to charge with that termf and the 
statute of frauds requires such a modification of a commission 
agreement to be in writing. However, even if the statute of 
frauds did not apply, the court found no note, memorandum or even 
any oral agreement to support that term, and it never was 
mutually agreed upon. 
The trial court heard conflicting testimony regarding 
whether or not Edmunds agreed to modify the written commission 
agreement (set forth in the EMSA, Exhibit No. 2) so as to relieve 
Sprouse of personal liability for the commission in the event 
Jager defaulted. The trial judge, with his advantaged position 
to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and based on 
substantial and credible evidence, concluded that the parties did 
not so agree (Findings, M 7-9, R. vol. Ill, pp. 149-150). 
Further, marshalling of the disputed trial evidence shows an 
adequate basis to support the trial court's finding that the 
parties did not mutually agree to modify the written commission 
agreement so as to relieve Sprouse of liability if Jager 
defaulted. 
The award of attorney's fees was adequately supported by the 
evidence because Sprouse's counsel stipulated to the 
reasonableness of the fee, based on 150 hours at $60.00 an hour, 
for a total of $9,000.00. Sprouse's counsel and the court 
accepted the proffer, which requested an award of $9,000.00 
attorney's fees, without objection or cross-examination, and 
Sprouse cannot object for the first time on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED EVEN IF POINTS I, II, 
AND III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL ARE CORRECT 
BECAUSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF A $25,000.00 INTEREST 
IN THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The NAA (Exhibit No. 15) contains an assignraent of a 
$25,000.00 interest in the UREC. The first typed paragraph after 
the printed material provides: 
The Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to 
INTERWEST COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest 
as security for the payments set forth above in and to 
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated March 
29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller, and Arjen 
W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, located at 
231 West St. George Blvd, St. George, Utah. 
Edmunds, as the present holder of that instrument, is 
entitled to share in the proceeds of any foreclosure sale because 
of his $25,000.00 interest in the contract. 
Sprouse has acknowledged, in several ways, that Edmunds' 
rights by virtue of this partial assignment are equal to his own 
rights. First, Sprousefs answer to Edmunds counterclaim alleging 
these rights essentially admitted them (R. vol. I, pp. 143-144). 
Second, at trial, Sprousefs counsel proffered the testimony of 
Mrs. Sprouse to the effect that there would be an assignment to 
secure the commission with "the right to stand in the shoes of 
Mr. Sprouse and foreclose" (Tr. 255) . Third, on page 26 of 
Sprouse's brief on appeal, it states: "Sprouse argues that the 
NAA should be binding in all respects." Despite these 
admissions, Sprouse refuses to allow Edmunds to share in the 
proceeds of the sheriff's sale, at which Sprouse bid $360,000.00. 
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The trial court has also recognized Edmunds rights. Edmunds 
filed a counterclaira against Sprouse asserting his rights under 
the assignment and a cross-claim against Jager asserting the 
right to join with Sprouse in foreclosure (R. vol. I, pp. 
126-134). Edmunds claimed a $25,000.00 interest in the UREC and 
rights equal to Sprouse. Subsequently, the court entered its 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and made a finding of fact 
that Edmunds was entitled to attorney's fees of $1,500.00 in the 
enforcement of his rights and the foreclosure of Jagerfs interest 
under the UPEC (R. vol. II, pp. 99-99, 5 10, p. 94). The fees of 
$1,500.00 awarded to Edmunds were included in the judgment of 
$472,473.40 Sprouse obtained against Jager (R. vol. II, p. 97). 
Later, all parties stipulated to a reduction of Sprouse's fees 
(from $15,000.00 to $3,720.50), but Edmunds fees remained at 
$1,500.00. Based on the stipulation, the court ordered the 
judgment reduced accordingly (R. vol. II, pp. 188-191). 
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Appendix "B") 
ordered the property sold at a sheriff's sale. It then ordered 
"that the proceeds of said sale shall be paid over to the Clerk" 
to be distributed only by court order "following an adjudication 
of claims" in Jager's counterclaim and "claims existing between 
Plaintiff (Sprouse) and Defendant Artie Edmunds". The claims of 
ICP in intervention were also covered. It is clear that the 
court recognized Edmunds potential right to share in the proceeds 
of the sheriff's sale. The adjudication of these claims was part 
of the trial held July 1, 1988. Paragraph 14 of the Reinstated 
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Findings (R. vol. Ill, pp. 150-151) provides: 
"14. The Court finds that defendant [Sprouse] gave 
plaintiffs [ICP] an assignment of a $25,000.00 interest 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Trial Exhibit P-3) 
when defendant signed Trial Exhibit P-15 [the NAA] . 
The Court further finds that plaintiffs are therefore 
entitled to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's 
sale of the Oasis Motel, which the Court finds was held 
on December 10, 1987, at which the Oasis Motel property 
was sold to defendant as the highest bidder for the bid 
of $360,000.00." 
The sale was noticed to be for "the highest and best bidder 
for cash, lawful money of the United States." (R. vol. II, pp. 
100-101.) Sprouse did not pay cash, nor did he deposit with the 
Clerk any money as the court had ordered. Sprouse apparently 
felt that since most of the money was owed to him anyway, there 
was no need to comply. Sprouse fs conduct has ignored the fact 
that he made a $25,000.00 assignment of the contract. 
A. Because Sprouse Included The Commission (NAA) In His 
Judgment Against Jager, He Has Acknowledged His Liability. 
Sprouse has acknowledged an obligation to pay the commission 
by including the $25,000.00 commission in his judgment against 
Jager. Sprouse testified at trial that he wanted $450,000.00 for 
the Oasis Motel and that any commission would have to be added to 
that amount. He testified that before he agreed to sign the 
$475,000.00 offer (Exhibit No. 2), he insisted on changing the 
six (6%) percent commission (which would have been $28,500.00) to 
a $25,000.00 commission, so that he would receive $450,000.00 for 
the property. The price of $475,000.00 therefore includes the 
commission. The $85,000.00 agreed equity in the three properties 
Sprouse received from Jager at closing reduced the contract from 
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$475,000.00 to $390,000.00. Since Sprouse received those 
properties (and still has them), the commission was included in 
the unpaid balance of $390,000.00, for which Jager signed notes 
and made payments until he defaulted. 
The judgment Sprouse obtained against Jager was for 
$472,473.40, and included $386,275.13 as the principal balance 
owed on the $390,000.00 notes. Thus, the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure includes the full balance owed by Jager on the 
contract, and thereby includes the very commission which Sprouse 
is now attempting to avoid. Further, Sprouse included in his 
judgment $59,542.42 accrued interest on the $386,275.13. That 
means his judgment even includes interest on the commission. 
Sprouse accuses Edmunds, on page 24 of his brief, of wanting 
to have his cake and eat it too. However, it is Sprouse who (A) 
took Jager1 s $85,000.00 worth of traded properties (and is still 
receiving substantial payments on them); (B) took Jager's 
payments until he defaulted; (C) took the motel back along with 
$100,000.00 worth of undisputed improvements; and (D) took a 
judgment against Jager that included the $25,000.00 interest that 
he had assigned for the commission. Even after giving Jager 
credit for the $360,000.00 he bid at the sheriff's sale, Sprouse 
still has a judgment of over $100,000.00 against Jager which he 
can collect. That judgment even includes $1,500.00 of Edmunds' 
attorney's fees, yet Sprouse has refused to allow Edmunds to 
share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale. Sprouse cannot be 
allowed to obtain a judgment including the commission without 
having to account for it to his assignee. 
19 
B. Edmunds, As The Holder Of The NAA, Is Entitled To Share In 
The Proceeds From The Sheriff's Sale, Because Assigned 
Rights Under A Real Estate Contract Are Treated Like A 
Mortgage. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract Sprouse and Jager signed is 
freely assignable (3 18, Exhibit No. 3). By an assignment, the 
assignee takes the same rights his assignor had, and an 
assignment transfers the interest of one party in certain 
property to another. Tanner v. Lawler 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P. 2d 
882 (1957); Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co. 608 P. 2d 236 (Utah 1980). 
In Butler v. Wilkinson 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 1987) , at 
1255-56, the court recognized that the vendor under an 
installment land contract has an interest that he can sell or 
mortgage that is measured by the amount the vendee owes under the 
contract, which is given the same special priority as purchase 
money mortgages in order to provide the critical security 
essential for an installment contract to be a commercially 
reasonable way of selling real estate. Sprouse sold, or 
mortgaged, $25,000.00 of his interest in the UREC with Jager, and 
Edmunds, as the holder, is entitled to the same protection the 
law affords Sprouse. 
A partial assignment, whether stated as an amount or 
fraction, " . . . is operative as to that part to the same extent 
and in the same manner as if the part had been a separate right." 
Restatement, Contracts 2d § 326 (1) . Since Sprouse retained title 
to the motel under the UREC for security, he is treated as a 
constructive trustee of the collateral for the assignee (Edmunds) 
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when he has made such an assignment and holds the collateral 
(see, Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 340(2)). 
In Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank 734 P. 2d 904 
(Utah 1987) the court said that: 
" . . . when a borrower assigns an interest in a real 
estate contract as security for a loan, the 
assignee-lender acquires a lien on the borrower's 
interest in the real property which is treated like a 
mortgage." 
Sprouse assigned the $25,000.00 interest in the UREC as 
security for the commission he owed. Edmunds, the present holder 
and assignee, acquired a lien on Sprouse's interest in the motel 
that is treated like a mortgage. 
In Campbell v. Warren 726 P. 2d 623 (Ariz. App. 1986) the 
court quoted from Batesville Institute v. Kauffman 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 151, 153, 21 L.Ed. 775, 776 (1873), as follows: 
fl[N]o principle is better settled than this, that the 
assignment of a debt carries with it an assignment of a 
judgment or mortgage by which it is secured. If a part 
only of the debt is assigned, a pro tanto portion of 
the security follows it." 
At the very least, Edmunds is entitled to a pro rata share 
of the proceeds from the sheriff's sale, which would be 
$20,091.78. This is calculated by dividing the $360,000.00 
proceeds by $461,193.90 (the total judgment as raodified by the 
stipulated reduction of Sprouse's fees), and multiplying the 
resulting fraction by $25,739.46 (the sum of the $24,239.46 
commission and the $1,500.00 of Edmund's fees which were both 
included in Sprouse's judgment). Since Sprouse has refused to 
recognize Edmunds assignment rights and has forced Edmunds to 
assert his legal rights under the NAA (under both the note and 
the assignment set forth in the NAA), Edmunds is also entitled to 
his attorney's fees in this action against Sprouse as provided in 
the NAA. Further, Edmunds is entitled to interest on these 
amounts because they were included in Sprousefs judgment and 
because Sprouse has refused to allow Edmunds to share in the 
sales proceeds or to pay the proceeds into court. 
C. Edmunds Assigned Rights In The UREC Are Entitled To Priority 
In Payment Because The Portion Assigned Has Priority Over 
The Portion Retained And Because Of The Intent To Pay The 
Commission First. 
The $360,000.00 from the sheriff's sale must be applied in 
satisfaction of the judgment. The issue is how should the 
$360,000.00 received at the sale be applied to the $25,000.00 
interest assigned and the $365,000.00 ($390,000.00 minus 
$25,000.00) interest retained by Sprouse? Should it all go to 
Sprouse's interest first? To Edmund's interest first? To both 
interests in proportionate or pro rata amounts? 
Since assignments of rights under land contracts are treated 
like mortgages (Utah Farm, supra), we look to the law of 
mortgages to determine priority. An assignment of a mortgage or 
contract debt operates as an assignment of the underlying 
mortgage or contract itself, and this rule extends to a partial 
assignment, which carries with it a proportional interest in the 
contract and vests the assignee with the powers and rights of the 
mortgagee as fully as if he had been made such in the original 
contract (55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, §§1284 and 1301) . 
The question of priority of partial assignments which are 
secured by the same contract that secures the interest retained 
by the assignor are said to involve ". . .an inquiry as to an 
iraplied agreement, and, if none, a consideration of the existence 
of an equity in favor of the assignee arising out of the 
assignment." (§ 1321 of 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages). Here, there 
is such an equity, as the proof shows that the $25,000.00 
commission amortizes first, in four years, while Sprouse's 
retained interest amortizes in 25 years (Trial Exhibit No. 20) . 
It is also clear that the parties intended that the commission 
should be fully paid by the time the amount owed by Jager was 
reduced to $375,000.00 (Trial Exhibit No. 22). It is clear that 
the commission was to be retired and paid first. 
The rule on this issue is found at 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages 
§ 1325, where it states: 
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. . . that where several notes are secured by one 
mortgage and some of them are assigned, the assignees 
take precedence over the assignor with respect to the 
notes retained by the assignor. . . . Even in the 
courts that apply the prorata rule, there is some 
conflict as to its application between an assignor and 
assignee. By some, the equity arising out of the fact 
that the holder of some notes is the assignee of the 
holder of others is held to be strong enough to take 
the case out of the general rule, and the assignee is 
considered as entitled to a preference over the 
assignor." 
The reason for the rule was explained in Lawson v. Warren 34 
Okl. 94, 124 P. 2d 46 (1912), referring to Jones on Mortgages 
(6th Ed.) § 1701, as follows: 
"Whers a holder of a mortgage assigns a part of it, 
although he warrants only the existence of the debt at 
the time of the transfer, it would be contrary to good 
faith to permit him, after receiving the money for this 
part of the claim, to come into competition with his 
assignee, if the property prove insufficient to pay the 
claims of both. Unless the intention be plainly 
declared on the face of the assignment that the 
assignee is to share pro rata in the security with the 
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assignor, the equitable construction of it is that it 
must in the first place be applied for the payment of 
the part of the debt which was assigned." 
The court then gave the following example: 
"The reason the assignee is to be preferred is founded 
on the plainest principle of equity. When two notes 
are assigned to different persons, they are both 
presumed to have paid value, and they must share 
equally in the proceeds of the mortgaged property in 
order to preserve the equality which is equity. But to 
apply the same rule between the mortgagee and a person 
to whom he had transferred one of the notes would lead 
to inequality. For illustration, say that the 
mortgagee holds two notes for $1,000 each. He assigns 
one of them for value. The property securing their 
payment only brings $1,000, or enough to pay one note. 
If the mortgagee shares in the proceeds he will get out 
of the debt $1,500, the $1,000 he received for the 
first note and the $500 he receives from the proceeds 
of the mortgaged property, while the assignee for half 
the debt only receives $500. The mortgagee would thus 
receive more than if he had kept both notes. This is 
not right." 
Sprouse received full value for the $25,000.00 assignment, 
because he was obligated to pay a $25,000.00 commission at the 
closing (Exhibit No. 2, bottom of page 2). Limiting Edmunds to a 
pro rata portion allows Sprouse to receive more than full value 
for the assignment because the $25,000.00 commission debt is 
extinguished plus he recovers a percentage of what he had 
assigned to pay the commission. Therefore, Edmunds should be 
given priority and should be paid in full from the proceeds of 
the sheriff1s sale and the balance belongs to Sprouse. Not only 
was it the intent to pay the commission first (in 4 years, while 
the UREC ran for 25 years) , but the partial assignment is, by 
law, entitled to priority. 
Nor can Sprouse argue that his bid was a so-called "credit 
bid" and that he is not obligated to actually pay the amount he 
OA 
bid. While that theory may be appropriate when there are no 
other interested parties, in this case there was a court order 
that the amount bid be paid into the Clerk of the Court because 
of existing and unadjudicated claims, Edmunds1 being one of them. 
Sprouse violated the court order by not paying to the Clerk the 
$360,000.00 he bid, and is in contempt of court under Rule 
69(e)(4), URCP. Utah mortgage foreclosure law makes no 
exceptions for sellers who bid, and Rule 69 must be strictly 
followed. 
D. Even If The Paragraph Of The NAA Purporting To Relieve 
Sprouse Of Personal Liability Is Valid, Edmunds Must Be Paid 
In Full From The $360,000.00 Proceeds From The Sheriff's 
Sale. 
Sprousefs entire appeal rests on one paragraph of the NAA, 
the second to last paragraph, which says: 
"The parties hereto understand and agree that this 
instrument does not obligate the undersigned to 
personally pay the amounts set forth herein. The 
obligation for payment hereunder arises only out of the 
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom (sic) 
Real Estate Contract referred to above." (Emphasis 
Added.) 
Although the NAA was not signed by Edmunds, ICP or anyone 
else but Sprouse, he claims that Edmunds agreed to this at the 
time Sprouse signed the offer (Exhibit No. 2) at his home in Las 
Vegas. Although Sprouse admits that he insisted on changing the 
six (6%) percent commission to $25,000.00 at that time, he claims 
that there wasn't room to make the change. However, all that 
needed to be added was that the commission was only payable from 
Jager's payments, and Sprouse was not personally liable. There 
was room for that much. 
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But even if we assume that Sprouse's claims are correct, 
Edmunds is still entitled to full payment from the sheriff's sale 
proceeds because those proceeds are received by Heritage, or were 
agreed to be received through Heritage, and they must be treated 
as such. 
Sprouse and Jager agreed, in paragraph 17 of the UREC 
(Exhibit No. 3) upon Heritage serving as the escrow agent and as 
trustee (see also Exhibit No. 6, the Escrow Agreement). Sprouse, 
in his second amended complaint, elected the remedy of paragraph 
16C of the UREC (R. vol. I, pp. 93-103). This remedy provides 
that Heritage, as trustee, is to proceed with the foreclosure. 
Thus, any proceeds from the foreclosure must necessarily pass 
through Heritage, as Sprouse and Jager so agreed. 
The parties are bound to strictly follow the foreclosure 
procedure set out in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. As stated 
in 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 695, page 636: 
"A sale made under the authority of a power of sale in 
a mortgage or deed of trust must be in strict 
compliance with that power. The power is limited and 
defined by the instrument in which it is contained . . 
. . neither the trustee nor the court should disregard 
the terms of the power. Accordingly, the trustee or 
mortgagee must see that in all material matters he 
keeps within his powers, and must execute the trust in 
strict compliance therewith. . . . The power to sell 
is a matter of contract and the parties are bound to a 
strict observance of its terms." 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently followed this rule in 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services 6 4 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20 (09/01/87), when the court said: 
"The maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may 
condition the exercise of the power upon such 
conditions as he may describe. 
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The grantor of the power is entitled to have his 
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale 
given; to have it take place at the time and place, and 
by the person appointed by hinu (Citations Omitted)• 
The right of a grantor of a deed of trust to have its 
provisions strictly complied with to effect a valid 
foreclosure sale is absolute." (Emphasis Added.) 
In this case, the parties have, by their contract, agreed 
that the escrow agent, Heritage, is to handle any foreclosure. 
It therefore follows that any amount bid at the sheriff's sale 
would be received by Heritage and therefore available for payment 
of the commission, no matter what interpretation the NAA is 
given. 
POINT II 
THE NAA IS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE BROKER 
IS THE PARTY TO BE CHARGED WHEN THE LANDOWNER ALLEGES 
A MODIFICATION AGREEMENT THAT ELIMINATES A COMMISSION. 
NONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE CLAIMED BY SPROUSE 
APPLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Sprouse argues that the paragraph of the N£A, which purports 
to relieve him of liability if Jager defaults, is not within the 
statute of frauds, or even if it is, that the broker is not the 
"party to be charged", and need not sign it for it to be binding 
upon him. Even if Sprouse is right on both these points, he then 
must show that there actually was an agreement, or mutual assent, 
to that paragraph. Knowing this, Sprouse also contends in his 
brief that the trial court erred in finding that there was no 
such agreement. That issue will be addressed next, although it 
need not be reached because the statute of frauds does apply to 
that paragraph of the NAA. 
A further problem, not addressed in Sprouse1s brief, is that 
Sprouse only alleges that Edmunds, the real estate sales agent, 
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orally agreed to that paragraph. Sprouse makes no claim that the 
broker agreed to the same paragraph. General business havoc 
would result if brokers were suddenly confronted with determining 
the validity of various oral promises or agreements allegedly 
made by their selling agents. 
Another obvious question Sprouse has not addressed or 
answered is this: What was the point of giving the broker a 
$25,000.00 assignment of the contract, if it was true that if 
Jager defaulted, no further payments were required? Obviously, 
there is absolutely no point in making such as assignment if that 
was the understanding. If Jager defaults, the ball game is over, 
and the assignment for security is completely useless. 
The Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4(5) of the Utah Code, 
provides that: 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
. . . . 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation." (Emphasis Added). 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Exhibit No. 2) contains a 
sufficient writing signed by Sprouse (bottom of page 2) , who is 
the party to be charged under it (since it is his obligation to 
pay the commission) and therefore satisfies the statute of 
frauds. It establishes Sprousefs obligation to pay, and the 
broker's right to receive, the $25,000.00 commission. 
Sprouse claims that his obligation to pay the commission was 
modified by the NAA, which was signed by him but not by the 
broker or by Edmunds. Several Utah cases have held that if an 
original agreement is within the statute of frauds (such as a 
coramission agreement) , a subsequent agreement which modifies the 
original written agreement must also satisfy the requirements of 
the statute of frauds to be enforceable. Coombs v. Ouzounian 24 
Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356; Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions 
88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489; Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian 71 
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020. 
In Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt (Utah 1975) 538 P.2d 
1319, the Court said: 
"It is elementary that when a contract is required to 
be in writing, the same requirement applies with equal 
force to any alteration or modification thereof." 
The rule appears well settled in Utah. Since Sprouse is 
attempting to hold the broker and Edmunds to the NAA, it must be 
signed by them as the "party to be charged". It is not. Sprouse 
cannot unilaterally alter or modify the agreement by signing 
documents which have not been signed by the broker or Edmunds. 
Sprouse contends that only the landowner is a party to be 
charged, and that the statute of frauds does not require the 
broker to sign a commission agreement or an agreement modifying a 
commission agreement. It that were the case, the statute should 
simply say "landowner" instead of "party to be charged". It is 
clear that the "party to be charged" under the original 
coraraission agreement (Exhibit No. 2) is Sprouse, since he has the 
obligation to pay $25,000.00. But the broker is the "party to be 
charged" under any alleged agreeraent, like the second to last 
paragraph in the NAA, that would reduce or eliminate altogether 
the obligation to pay. That is why it is important for the 
"party to be charged" to manifest his assent by a signed writing. 
Sprouse claim that the statute operates in only one 
direction is wrong. Although Sprouse correctly refers to cases 
which say Section 25-5-4(5) is intended to protect landowners 
against fraudulent claims for commissions, that is not the only 
reason for the statute. In Ney v. Harrison 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 
2d 1114 (1956) , the court found two policies implicit in the 
statute: 
"The protection of the landowner from the imposition of 
spurious claims by real estate brokers, or the 
necessity of protecting the broker, who has rendered a 
bona fide service, from being refused just compensation 
for his work by the landowner." 
According to the comment to Section 135 of Restatement, 
Contracts 2d, the words "party to be charged" refer to the party 
to be charged in the legal proceeding. Other authorities say the 
party to be charged is the party against whom the alleged 
contract or memorandum is sought to be enforced (72 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statute of Frauds § 364; 94 ALR2d 921). The statute operates, 
then, as needed, to protect both the landowner and the broker. 
In this case, it protects the broker from an alleged oral 
agreement that would wash away his compensation if Jager 
defaulted. 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis 646 P.2d 741 (Utah, 
1982) is a case dealing with exactly the same issue under 
subparagraph (2), instead of (5), of the same statute of frauds. 
It was an action against Francis, a guarantor, for amounts due on 
a written personal guarantee. On appeal, a summary judgment 
against Francis was affirmed against his contention that whether 
or not plaintiff had orally released him from liability on the 
guarantee was a genuine issue of material fact. The Court held 
that even if an oral release were proved, it would be 
unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of frauds. 
The Court noted that the personal guarantee was in writing, as 
required by §25-5-4(2) of the Utah Code, and was signed by 
Francis, the party to be charged by it. The Court then said: 
"By the same token, the release or revocation of an 
agreement to answer for the debt of another must also 
be in writing. It is well settled that if an original 
agreement is within the Statute of Frauds, any 
subsequent agreement which alters or amends it must 
also satisfy the requirements of the Statute. 
(Citations omitted.) The alleged oral release 
obviously does not meet those requirements of 
enforceability." 
The oral release must be signed by the plaintiff as the 
party to be charged with it. The same applies here—Sprouse must 
sign the original commission agreement, as he is charged with it 
(just as Francis was charged with the guarantee), and the broker 
must sign an agreement releasing the commission (just as the 
plaintiff above would have to sign such a release to be charged 
with it). In SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber 732 P. 2d 105 (Utah 
1986) it was said that an agreement to terminate or rescind a 
contract, such as the commission contract in issue here, must be 
done by a written contract if the contract that is extinguished 
falls within the Statute of Frauds. The NAA, not being signed by 
the broker, is not sufficient. 
Sprouse!s brief says that brokers owed a commission do not 
acquire an interest in land that merits the statute's protection. 
This is a curious statement, because even a cursory reading of 
Section 25-5-4 shows that it has 6 subsections, none of which 
necessarily have anything to do with an interest in land, and all 
of which are subject to the "party to be charged" language. 
Sprouse is confusing Section 25-5-4 with 25-5-1. 
Sprouse has failed to present any relevant authority for his 
claim that terms of the NAA which purport to modify the 
coraraission agreement do not have to be in writing signed by the 
broker as the party to be charged. There is no such authority, 
and the law is to the contrary. 
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers, § 52, page 811, the general rule 
is stated as follows: 
"If the original contract employing a broker is 
required to be in writing, any modification thereof 
which results in a new contract must itself be in 
writing to be effective to confer on the agent the 
right to compensation in accordance with the modified 
contract." 
Also, in 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 274, page 789, 
"The broad general doctrine as announced by most 
authorities is that a contract required by the statute 
of frauds to be in writing cannot be validly changed or 
modified as to any material condition therein by 
subsequent oral agreement so as to make the original 
written agreement as modified by the oral one an 
enforceable obligation. To state the rule differently, 
where an original agreement comes within provisions of 
the statute of frauds requiring certain agreements to 
be in writing, the statute of frauds renders invalid 
and ineffectual a subsequent oral agreement changing 
the terras of the written contract." 
Utah follows this general rule. In Golden Key Realty, Inc. 
v. Mantas 699 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1985), a case where a broker sued 
for his commission, the Court said: 
"The rule is well settled in Utah that if an original 
agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement which modifies the original written agreement 
must also satisfy the requirements of the statute of 
frauds to be enforceable." 
Sprouse cites this case as similar because the statute of 
frauds was avoided in Golden Key by finding an accord and 
satisfaction, a different question than modification of a 
commission agreement. If Sprouse is attempting to assert that 
the NAA accomplished an accord and satisfaction, it must be 
pointed out that accord and satisfaction is an affirmative 
defense that must be pleaded or it is waived. See Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co. 664 P. 2d 1188 (Utah 1983). 
Sprouse has failed to plead accord and satisfaction or raise it 
as a defense at any time prior to his brief. 
Sprouse's claim that the NAA is not within the statute of 
frauds because it altered only terms of commission payment and 
not terms of employment is without merit. Price and terms are 
frequently the most important term in contracts. In this case, 
the parties made the terms of commission payment expressly 
material, since Exhibit No. 2 provides (in the section on the 
commission) that the terms cannot be changed without the broker's 
consent. It is difficult to conceive, at least from the broker's 
viewpoint, of any term more material to a commission agreement 
than the amount of the commission and the time of its payment. 
Mr. Sprousefs attorney is misleading the court when he 
quotes C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988) 
as standing for the proposition that only the matter or fact of 
eraployraent is within the statute of frauds, but that the terras of 
the coraraission, such as amount, time of payment etc. are not 
within the statute of frauds. Counsel fails to continue with the 
quoted material, which makes it clear that all the terras of the 
eraployraent have to be made definite under the statute of frauds. 
The Utah court is quoting the California case dealing with 
whether or not the legal description of the land needs to be 
described specifically, which full quote, provides: 
"the essential part of a contract to employ a real 
estate broker, so far as the statute of frauds is 
concerned, is the matter of the employment and 
consequently need not describe the land specifically, 
if the terras of the employment can be made definite 
without it." [i.e., without describing the land, an 
entirely different issue than the issue here]. 
Terms of employment include the amount of the commission to 
be paid, the date of its payment etc. Sprouse fails to cite any 
relevant authority for his argument that the terras of 
compensation are nothing more than a security agreement, are not 
raaterial parts of the contract, and are not within the statute of 
frauds. On the contrary, these kind of terms have been held 
material and within the statute of frauds. Foster v. Mutual 
Savings Asso. 602 SW2d 98 (Texas 1980) . According to Mr. 
Sprousefs position, only the fact of employment is required to 
comply with the statute of frauds and therefore be in writing 
signed by the party to be charged. This theory would eviscerate 
the intent and purpose of the statute of frauds, which is 
designed to protect both the landowner and the broker against 
fraudulent or fictitious claims. Nothing would stop an agent or 
broker, once the fact of eraployraent is established, to maintain 
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that the owner agreed to a 20%, or 30% or even 50% coraraission. 
Likewise, nothing would stop the landowner from asserting, if the 
fact of employment is established, that the agent or broker 
agreed to accept 5%, 3% or even forgo the commission. 
Sprouse also contends that because the NAA was assigned to 
Edmunds, then to Draper Bank, and then back to Edmunds, that 
these subsequent assignments are a sufficient writing to satisfy 
the statute. However, these subsequent assignments dealt with 
only the note portion of the NAA and made no specific reference 
to the agreement portion which purports, under only Mr. Sprouse's 
signature, to constitute an agreement that no further commissions 
would be payable if Jager defaults. These assignraents do not 
relate to the transaction between Sprouse & Jager, or even 
between Sprouse and ICP, but relate to subsequent transactions in 
which the right to receive the commission was passed on to other 
parties. 
The unrebutted evidence presented at trial showed that the 
assignment from ICP to Edmunds was made for full value, dollar 
for dollar, with Edmunds giving ICP cash of $9,000.00 for its 
interest in the contract, and that it was done without knowledge 
of the language in the NAA's second to last paragraph. This is 
an obvious indication that the parties did not agree to the NAA 
term relieving Sprouse of liability if Jager defaulted, as 
Edmunds would certainly not be foolish enough to pay $9,000.00 
for a note that could evaporate into nothing if Jager defaulted, 
a situation far beyond his control. When Jager did default, 
Draper Bank sent the note back to Edmunds, contending that 
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Edmunds was still fully liable to Draper Bank. This conduct 
shows that Draper Bank had not agreed to the NAA paragraph 
limiting Sprouse1s liability when it received the assignment (see 
Trial Exhibit No. 19). 
There must also be something in the subsequent assignments 
that clearly show that Edmunds agreed to and accepted the term of 
the NAA that says Sprouse is not personally liable. This 
distinguishes this case from those cited by Sprouse. There is 
simply nothing in any of the subsequent assignments that even 
suggests a connection, let alone an agreement, to that term. The 
subsequent assignments, rather than showing an agreement to the 
disputed term of the NAA, are actually evidence that the term was 
never agreed upon, otherwise, it is highly doubtful that anyone 
would be willing to accept or pay value for such an assignment. 
In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the additional 
writings a party asserts must contain all the essential terms and 
provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed, and 
must set out the conditions of the transaction with adequate 
certainty, which requirement is not met if the additional 
writings lack any acknowledgement or recognition that the parties 
have entered into the alleged agreement. See Machan Hampshire 
Properties v. Western Real Estate & Dev. 779 P. 2d 230 (Utah 
1989). 
Sprouse claims that because of the subsequent assignments 
and because 13 payments were received on the note, that Edmunds 
has manifested his consent to the NAA. That may be true for the 
"note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA, because all the 
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parties testified that it was agreed that Sprouse would sign a 
note with interest and secure it by an assignment of the UREC, 
but it is certainly not true of the "agreement" portion of the 
NAA, to which neither he nor his broker consented. 
Sprouse has only indirectly mentioned the issue of part 
performance on appeal, so suffice it to say that this issue was 
fully briefed for the trial court (see R. vol. II, pp. 267-271). 
The acceptance by Draper Bank of 13 payments does not constitute 
part performance and take the NAA out of the statute of frauds 
because the payments are not "exclusively referable" to that 
alleged term, but are consistent with the "note" portion of the 
NAA, which is not disputed. See, for example, Downtown Athletic 
Club v. Horman 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah 1987). 
The issues in this case are very similar to those in 
Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson 672 P. 2d 746 (Utah, 1983) 
because there was not enough cash available at the closing to 
meet the needs of the parties. The broker, who was entitled to a 
$51,000.00 commission, took only $15,000.00 of it at the closing 
and the seller signed a note for the balance of $36,000.00. When 
the buyer filed for bankruptcy and failed to make further 
payments, the seller refused to pay the note, claiming, exactly 
as Sprouse has done here, that (1) payment of the balance of the 
commission was conditioned upon the buyer's payments; (2) that 
the escrow agreement, which provided for distribution of the 
commission from the buyer's payments, showed an agreement that 
the broker would not look beyond payments coming through the 
escrow agreement for payment of the commission; and (3) since the 
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buyer defaulted, the broker had not produced a buyer who was 
ready, willing and able, a condition to payment on the note. All 
three of these defenses failed. The district court granted the 
broker's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the judgment 
was affirmed. The court said: 
"Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the 
right to a commission on the performance of the buyer, 
the general rule accepted in Utah is that a broker has 
earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer who 
is ready, willing and able and who is accepted by the 
seller. The broker is not an insurer of the subsequent 
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his 
right to a commission by the failure or refusal of the 
buyer to perform." 
The court rejected the seller's claim that the escrow 
agreement, because it specifically provided for payment of the 
commission out of payments made by the buyer, constituted an 
agreement by the broker not to look beyond the escrow payments: 
"Furthermore, the defendants' contention that the 
plaintiff look only to the buyer's payments into escrow 
for its commission would render the note meaningless 
and ignore the undisputed benefit received by the 
defendants from the plaintiff's agreement to defer part 
of the commission due at closing. On its face, the 
escrow agreement merely provides for a method of 
distribution of the payments made by the buyer." 
The same reasoning applies in this case. Sprouse was 
obligated to pay the commission at closing. To hold that 
third-party plaintiffs must look only to Jager's payments for the 
commission would render the note and assignment portions of 
Exhibit No. 15, the NAA, meaningless and ignores the undisputed 
benefit Sprouse received from the broker's willingness to defer 
the payment of the commission over a four year period. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE TRI£L COURT'S FINDING 
THAT THERE WAS NO MUTUAL CONSENT TO THE DISPUTED TERM OF 
THE NAA. THEREFORE, THE COURT'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE NOTE 
AND ASSIGNMENT PORTIONS OF THE NAA WAS APPROPRIATE. 
If a contract's interpretation is determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent, then it is a question of fact. Seashores 
Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It 
follows that if a contract's very existence is determined by 
extrinsic evidence, it is also a question of fact. When a 
contract is ambiguous and the court finds facts regarding the 
parties' intent based on extrinsic evidence, the court's review 
is strictly limited. Copper State Leasing Co. v> Blackner 
Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988). In these 
circumstances, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed 
or set aside on appeal unless they are "clearly erroneous", or 
against the clear weight of the evidence and the appellate court 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). When the 
evidence is controverted, the appellate court assumes that the 
trial judge believed those aspects of the evidence and the 
inferences reasonably drawn from them that support his decision. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 
1302 (Utah 1987) . 
Sprouse's duty on appeal is to marshall all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, and then demonstrate that 
the court's findings are clearly erroneous. Sprouse has failed 
to marshall the evidence supporting the court's findings, but 
even a brief review shows that the court's findings are amply 
supported. 
Sprouse claims that Edmunds agreed that he would not be 
personally liable for the commission at the time he signed the 
EMSA. Evidence showed that Sprouse is a seasoned and experienced 
businessman with several business interests, including other 
motels (Tr. 165, 196). He admitted that he knew such an 
agreement should have been in writing, but weakly claims there 
"wasn't room" on the EMSA (Tr. 178, 193). However, he found room 
to have the commission reduced from six (6%) percent to 
$25,000.00, and this change was made at his insistence (Tr. 
91-93, 193, 196). The fact is there was plenty of room, either 
in the commission section itself, or by an attached addendum, of 
which there were already two pages (Exhibit No. 2) . A third 
would be no trouble. In the commission section itself, the last 
part of the last line could have been blacked out after the word 
"payable" and words added to reflect such an agreement. For 
example, it could easily have been changed to read: "Said 
commission shall be payable only from Jager's monthly payments 
and Sprouse is not personally liable for any part of the 
commission." 
Edmunds testified there was no such agreement or even 
discussion (Tr. 105, 118, 148), and that his broker was adamantly 
opposed to anything like that and would never allow him to enter 
into such an agreement (Tr. 118) . Roy Larsen, the broker, 
testified he had not agreed to such an arrangement, and never 
would authorize such an arrangement (Tr. 26-27) . Claudia Ashby 
and Roy Larsen both testified that, in all their years of 
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experience, they had never encountered a situation where the 
seller's liability for the commission was excused if the buyer 
defaulted, although they both estimated that commission deferral 
occurs in about 10% of the closings (Tr. 19-20, 36, 42-43). 
James Ivins simply made a mistake. Although he testified 
his recollection was that Edmunds had told him what he put in the 
second to last paragraph of Exhibit No. 15 (Tr. 241), he admitted 
that some parts of Exhibit No. 15 were his own creation, such as 
the assignment language (Tr. 2 29) , and he acknowledged that he 
was getting information on this transaction from lots of 
different people and places (Tr. 240) . The notes he had could 
have been from telephone conversations he had with Jager or 
Sprouse, as he admitted to having such calls (Tr. 211, 223). 
The key evidence on determining whether the parties ever 
agreed to the second to last paragraph of the NAA is Exhibit No. 
24, the handwritten note Ivins testified he received from Edmunds 
after the telephone call in which he thought Edmunds told him 
there would be no personal liability (Tr. 220, 237). Exhibit No. 
24 supports every paragraph of the NAA except the critical second 
to last paragraph, thereby showing, by what is not said, that 
there was no agreement that Sprouse would not be personally 
liable. Ivins testified this was a source document for preparing 
the NAA (Tr. 221) . Very conspicuous by its absence in Exhibit 24 
is any mention or reference to the commission not being payable 
if Jager defaults. Thus, this term was added either at the sole 
instance of Sprouse or simply by Ivins, who admitted that parts 
of the NAA were of his own creation. In either case, however, 
such added terms are not binding on third-party plaintiffs, who 
did not sign or assent to the added terms at any time. 
Proof that there was no such oral agreement is demonstrated 
by Edmunds subsequent conduct in giving up his $9,000.00 share of 
the commission on the Wyoming closing to obtain ICP's $9,000.00 
interest in the Sprouse-Jager commission (Tr. 29-30, 120-121). 
Although Edmunds was inexperienced, only a complete fool would 
give up $9,000 in cash to acquire a $9,000 interest in a note 
that could be wiped out if Jager defaulted. This is the clearest 
sort of contemporary evidence that Edmunds did not agree to such 
a term. 
The Court heard evidence from all the principal players 
regarding this NAA. The preparer of the document, Mr. Ivins, 
testified. The signer of the document, Mr. Sprouse, testified. 
The payees of the document, Roy Larsen (for Interwest Commercial 
Properties) and Mr. Edmunds testified. The Court allowed parol 
evidence concerning that document because it was ambiguous. It 
was ambiguous because it gives an assignment for security in one 
paragraph, but then purports to make that assignment meaningless 
in another paragraph which says that if Jager defaults, Sprouse 
is not personally liable. The Court accepted all this parol 
evidence in order to find the true intention of the parties, and 
found that there had been no meeting of the minds, or mutual 
assent, to the one term of the NAA that allegedly excuses Sprouse 
from liability if Jager defaults. 
The court appropriately found the agreement of the parties 
and enforced it. The "note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA 
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are enforceable against Sprouse because he signed it. Besides, 
those portions of the NAA were in fact agreed to by Edmunds and 
ICP (see Exhibit No. 24). But those portions of the NAA would be 
enforceable against Sprouse even if Edmunds and ICP didn't agree, 
because Sprouse's signature is the only signature required on a 
note or an assignment. 
The "agreement" portion of the NAA, however, being an 
agreement, requires that both parties to the agreement manifest 
their consent by signature. Since neither Edmunds nor ICP signed 
it, the court received extrinsic evidence to determine whether or 
not they ever orally agreed to its terms. The court found that 
the parties never agreed to the disputed term, and that it never 
became part of their agreement. Sprouse contends that the NAA is 
an "entire" contract and not "several", but it does not matter, 
since Sprouse is incorrectly assuming that the disputed second to 
last paragraph became part of the agreement, but it never did. 
In fact, the second to last paragraph of the NAA is contrary 
to and repugnant with the "assignment" paragraph two paragraphs 
above it in the same NAA. The first paragraph gives an 
assignraent of the UREC to secure the note, while the second 
purports to be an agreement that Sprouse alleges relieves him of 
liability if Jager defaults, even of liability to account to the 
assignee for the proceeds from the sheriff's sale. If the second 
is valid, it eviscerates the first, and if the first is valid, it 
contradicts the second. When there is a repugnancy between two 
clauses, it is the province and duty of the court to reconcile 
them if possible, but if not, a subsequent clause that is 
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irreconcilable with a former clause and repugnant to the general 
purpose and intent may be disregarded. Mifflin v. Shiki 77 Utah 
190, 293 P. 1. 
Thus, it was proper for the court to enforce the undisputed 
"note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA, and to disregard the 
second to last paragraph, or "agreement" part, since it was never 
signed and there never was any mutual assent to it. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. IN ANY EVENT, SPROUSE STIPULATED TO 
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES. NOT HAVING 
CHALLENGED THE FEES AT TRIAL, SPROUSE CANNOT 
DO SO FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. RESPONDENTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL FEES ON APPEAL. 
There should be no issue that Edmunds is entitled to an 
award of his attorney's fees. The court found (Reinstated 
Findings, R. vol. Ill, pp. 150, M 12-13) that an award of 
attorney's fees to Edmunds was supported by (1) the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement (Exhibit No. 2, see paragraph B, page 3; R. vol. 
II, p. 88); and (2) the attorney's fee provision of the "note" 
portion of the NAA (Exhibit No. 15) . It might also be pointed 
out that Edmunds, as the holder of a $25,000.00 interest in the 
UREC, is entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 14 of the 
UREC (Exhibit No. 3) for enforcement of his rights thereunder. 
Nevertheless, Sprouse attacks the trial court's award of 
$9,000.00 attorney's fees as "unreasonable". At the trial, 
Sprouse's attorney, R. Clayton Huntsman, suggested, as Mr. Miles 
was preparing to take the stand to testify, that perhaps a 
stipulation could be reached as to the reasonableness of the 
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fees, and told Mr. Miles to make a proffer (Tr. 162). Mr. Miles 
then made the proffer that he had devoted at least 150 hours to 
the case, and that his hourly rate was $60.00 an hour, and 
requested the court to award attorney's fees of $9,000.00 (Tr. 
162-163). Sprouse's attorney and the court accepted the proffer 
(Tr. 164; R. vol. II, p. 254). 
Sprouse1s attorney did not make any objection or even desire 
to cross-examine (Tr. 164) , nor did Sprouse offer any evidence 
whatsoever regarding attorney's fees. At the conclusion of the 
trial, since it was already 5:45 p.m., no oral argument was 
presented (Tr. 259) . Instead, the court took the matter under 
advisement and instructed both parties to file a written 
memorandum and written closing arguments (Tr. 258). Sprouse did 
not challenge the requested fees even in his written closing 
argument (R. vol. II, pp. 280-288). Sprouse should not be 
permitted to contest the fees for the first time on appeal. See 
Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence; Hardy v. Hardy 776 
P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Whittle 780 P.2d 819 
(Utah 1989) . 
About a month after the trial, Mr. Huntsman withdrew as 
Sprouse's counsel (R. vol. Ill, pp. 1-4), and after Mr. Miles 
gave Sprouse the required notice to appoint new counsel or appear 
in person (R. vol. Ill, pp. 5-8), Sprouse's present counsel 
entered an appearance (R. vol. Ill, pp. 11-12). 
When a proffer is made and accepted by opposing counsel and 
the court, the parties should be bound by the proffer. Proffers 
are useful in saving trial time, especially on those matters not 
seriously disputed. If the parties are not bound by the proffers 
made and accepted, no attorney could safely make a proffer for 
fear that some opposing party, or some new attorney, will raise 
the matter on appeal, long after the opportunity is lost to meet 
any legitimate objection that might have readily been presented 
at trial. 
If there had been any indication that the proffer was not 
fully accepted, Mr. Miles was prepared to take the stand and 
could have presented evidence establishing the legal work he had 
performed, and could have shown that his work was necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter, that his hourly fee is 
reasonable compared to rates charged by other attorney's in the 
locality, that the case presented issues of considerable novelty 
and difficulty, and that it was absolute necessary to intervene 
in the action to vindicate Edmunds rights because Sprouse had 
proceeded against Jager in total disregard of Edmunds rights as 
the holder of a $25,000.00 assignment under the UREC. 
If the court on appeal does not hold Sprouse to the 
stipulation and proffer that his counsel accepted at trial, the 
raatter should be remanded to the trial court for the opportunity 
to present the evidence that was foreclosed when Sprouse's 
counsel offered to stipulate to reasonableness and accepted the 
proffer made. But for the conduct of Sprousefs counsel, the 
detailed evidence would have been presented. 
Sprouse also makes a contention that the $9,000.00 award for 
fees should be reduced because Mr. Miles gave an approximate 
breakdown of his fees, and indicated that (1) about one-third of 
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his fees related to defense of counterclaims (both Jager's 
counterclaim and the counterclaim Sprouse pursued against 
third-party plaintiffs (R. vol. II, pp. 115-119); (2) about 
one-third of his fees related to the assertion of rights under 
the "assignment" portion of the NAA, including the right to 
foreclose (R. vol. I, pp. 126-134) and to share in the proceeds 
from the sheriff's sale; and (3) about one-third of his fees were 
related to enforcement of the "Note" portion of the NAA. 
Edmunds prevailed on all three claims. He defeated the 
counterclaims of both Jager and Sprouse. Jagerfs counterclaim 
was dismissed by stipulation (R. vol. II, pp. 192-195) and 
Sprousefs counterclaims were tried and dismissed (see Reinstated 
Findings and Judgment). Edmunds successfully asserted his rights 
under the "assignment" portion of the NAA, as the court, in 
Finding 14 (R. vol. Ill, pp. 150-151) found that Edmunds held a 
$25,000.00 interest in the UREC and was entitled to foreclose and 
share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale. (Note: Sprouse 
cannot complain about the reasonableness of the $3,000.00 fees 
for this part, since Sprouse's own fees for this part were 
allowed at $3,720.50). Edmunds also prevailed on his claims 
under the "note" portion of the NAA, and the court entered 
judgment for the amount due on the note. 
Having prevailed on all issues, Edmunds is entitled to his 
full attorney's fees. It was Sprouse's conduct that forced 
Edmunds and third-party plaintiffs to incur the fees. Had 
Sprouse acknowledged the assigned rights Edmunds held, including 
the right to participate in the foreclosure and to be paid, the 
fees would likely not have been needed. 
Edmunds and third-party plaintiffs are entitled to an 
additional award of their fees incurred since trial and on 
appeal. Management Services v. Development Associates 617 P.2d 
406 (Utah 1980) . 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court decision was supported by competent and 
credible evidence, and should be affirmed in all respects. This 
case should be remanded to the district court with instructions 
to take evidence on additional attorney's fees to be added to the 
judgment for fees necessarily and reasonably incurred since trial 
to defend the judgment, including reasonable attorney's fees for 
this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 77^u day of March, 1990. 
-STOHN L. MILES 
Attorney For Respondents 
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of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to Fred D. Howard and 
Leslie W. Slaugh, at HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, Attorneys At Law, 
120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84601 by first-class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, on this J*™- day of March, 1990. 
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APPENDIX ,fAM 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
(Entered November 5, 1987) 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 East 100 South, Suite 101 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
' 87 NOU 5 PD H 1H 
CLER!^ 
DEPUTY^A^W^ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SPROUSE, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, 
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, 
and JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-0982 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on 
October 14, 1987 on various motions of the parties. Plaintiff 
appeared by and through his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and 
Defendant Edmunds appeared by and through his attorney, John L. 
Miles and Defendants Arjen W. Jager and Nada H. Jager appeared by 
and through their attorney, Terry L. Wade. No appearances were 
made by any other named Defendant in person or through counsel. 
The Court having reviewed the file and having heard 
arguments and having denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the 
theory that judicial foreclosure was unavailable in these 
proceedings; and the Court having heard the statements of counsel 
and having taken testimony regarding the extent of the claim in 
foreclosure and reasonable attorney's fees associated with the 
foreclosure thereof and being fully advised in the premises now 
1 
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makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. By contract dated March 29, 1985 Defendant Arjen W. 
Jager contracted to purchased real property commonly known as the 
Oasis Motel from Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant Arjen W. Jager did not make the monthly 
installment payment due June 1, 1986 under the terms of the 
subject Uniform Real Estate Contract nor has he made any 
subsequent monthly installment payment which have fallen due 
since Junef 1986. 
3. Defendants Jager have now vacated the subject 
property. 
4. Defendant Nada H. Jager's interest in the subject 
real property arises out of a Quit-Claim Deed dated April 1, 
1985, executed by Defendant Arjen W. Jager and recorded in the 
office of the Washington County Recorder on June 21, 1986. 
5. Defendant Lloyd Walters has not filed an Answer to 
the Summons and Complaint served upon him in connection with the 
above-entitled proceedings and his default is appropriately 
entered. 
6. The principal unpaid obligation amounts to 
$386/275.13 and the interest accruing from the date of the last 
payment to this date is $59,542.42 with late charges of 
$1^358*50» 
7. Unpaid property taxes accruing through the term of 
Defendant's possession amount to $9,164.95. 
2 
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8. The underlying Uniform Real Estate Contract contains 
a provision allowing the Seller and assigns to recover attorney's 
fees in foreclosure proceedings. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
in the amount of $15,000.00 incurred in the enforcement of his 
rights and the foreclosure of Defendant Arjen W. Jager's rights 
in the subject property. 
10. Defendant Artie Edmunds is entitled to attorney's 
fees in the amount of $1,500.00 incurred in the enforcement of 
rights and the foreclosure of Defendant Arjen W. Jager's rights 
in the subject property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff and assigns, if any, are entitled to a 
Judgment and Decree foreclosing Defendant Arjen W. Jager's 
interest in the subject real property. 
2. The interest of Nada H. Jager in the subject real 
property is inferior and subordinate to the lien which is hereby 
foreclosed. 
3. The interest of Defendant Lloyd Walters has been 
extinguished by his default. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant Edmunds are entitled to an 
award of attorney's 
3 
fees. 
LET JUDGMENT BE RENDERED ACCORDINGLY. VCC : 
DATED this ^L^ day of ©e^ ofeer, 1987 
)istrict 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
Jcrtfn L. Miles 
Attorney for Edmunds 
Terry^L, Wade 
Attorney for Jagers 
APPENDIX "B" 
Judgment And Decree Of Foreclosure 
(Entered November 5, 1987) 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 East 100 South, Suite 101 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
_ / IFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASK"-:GTC;! COUNTY 
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CLERK _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
OEPUTY3S_2______1 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SPROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, 
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, 
and JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 86-0982 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on 
October 14, 1987 on various motions of the parties. Plaintiff 
appeared by and through his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and 
Defendant Edmunds appeared by and through his attorney, John L. 
Miles and Defendants Arjen W. Jager and Nada H. Jager appeared by 
and through their attorney, Terry L. Wade. No appearances were 
made by any other named Defendant in person or through counsel. 
The Court having reviewed the file and having heard 
arguments and having denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the 
theory that judicial foreclosure was unavailable in these 
proceedings; and the Court having heard the statements of counsel 
and having taken testimony regarding the extent of the claim in 
foreclosure and reasonable attorney's fees associated with the 
foreclosure thereof and being fully advised in the premises; 
1 •*Jiv 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff have 
Judgment against Defendant Arjen W. Jager in the principal amount 
of $386,275.13, together with interest in the amount of 
$59/542.42, late fees of $884.40, attorney's fees in the amount 
of $16,500.00, court costs in the amount of $106.50, and unpaid 
property taxes in the amount of $9,164.95 for a total Judgment of 
$472,473.40, together with after-accruing costs, said Judgment to 
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after the 
date of the execution hereof, until paid in full. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that certain Uniform Real 
Estate Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Plaintiff as 
Seller and Defendant Arjen W. Jager as purchaser is hereby 
ordered foreclosed, and the property described therein and 
hereinafter described shall be sold as provided by law at 
Sheriff's Sale, the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the 
payment of the Judgment set forth above and described. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceeds of said sale 
shall be paid over the Clerk of Washington County, State of Utah, 
to be held and deposited by said Court and to be distributed only 
by further order of this Court following an adjudication of 
claims asserted in Defendant Jager's Counterclaim and claims 
existing between Plaintiff and Defendant Artie Edmunds. It is 
further contemplated that additional claims may be asserted as a 
result of the intervention of Interwest Properties and others and 
it is the order of this Court that all funds remain on deposit 
with the Clerk pending adjudication of those claims as well as 
2 
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any additional claims Plaintiff may assert against Defendant 
Artie Edmunds following the amendment of any pleadings on file 
herein. The Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized and directed 
to deposit said funds in an interest bearing account, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff's vendor's lien is superior to and has priority over 
any interest of Defendant Nada H. Jager and Defendant Lloyd 
Walters. 
The real property effected by this Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure is situated in Washington Countyf State of Utah, 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
The East one-half (El/2) of Lot 6, and all of Lot 
7, in Block 23, Plat "A", St. George City Survey, 
less the following, to wit: 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of said Lot 7 
and running thence West 198 feet, thence South 86 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Nothing in this Judgment or Decree of Foreclosure shall 
be construed to act as an adjudication upon the merits of any of 
the above-mentioned claims existing between the parties other 
than Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Arjen W. Jager for 
foreclosure of the Uniform Real Estate Contract as a note and 
mortgage and the claims of Defendant Nada H. Jager and Defendant 
Lloyd Walters whose interest in the subject property will 
necessarily be extinguished by the sale of the property upon 
foreclosure. The Court furthermore reserves the power to modify 
any award of attorney's fees at the time of the resolution and 
3 
disposition of the claims remaining unadjudicated, 
DATED this £ — day of QefcotreT, 1987. 
C&CS&4— 
jy Ph i l ip Evj 
d i s t r i c t Jucrae 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
in L, Miles 
Attorney for Edmunds 
^ P 0, I Hint-
Terry £ . Wade" 
Attorney for Jagers 
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